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CASE NOTES
As a result of the Court's decision, the Commissioner no longer pos-
sesses the authority under section 482 to reallocate income to a sub-
sidiary which has not in fact received the prohibited funds.
Another example of a potential abuse encouraged by the majority
can arise where "captive insurance companies" are involved." In a
typical situation of this sort, a finance company establishes a subsid-
iary life insurance company that issues customer policies in connection
with the parent's business. The subsidiary then charges excessive
premiums on this business and succeeds in diverting a portion of
the parent's income to it." At the time of the passage of the Life
Insurance Company Tax Act for 1955,44 Congress was concerned
about this problem and was advised that under section 482 the Com-
missioner had power to prevent such diversion by reallocating income."
The holding of the Court in First Security Bank seems to ignore this
congressional concern.
In sum, First Security Bank can be said to encourage the forma-
tion of subsidiaries that will absorb the parent's income obtained from
illegal sources and will be taxed at lower rates than would the parent
on income diverted by the parent to the subsidiaries. The Commis-
sioner's power to reallocate income to effectuate the purposes of sec-
tion 482 is no longer an effective weapon against such practices. The
majority's reliance on the actual receipt of income is at odds with the
assignment of income cases as well as with section 61(a) and section 482
as previously interpreted, both of which incorporate the doctrine that
income is taxed to the true earner thereof." Finally, the Court's linkage
of illegality with nontaxability resurrects the Wilcox "claim of right"
doctrine and makes it available in cases of intercorporate transfers of
income. The revitalization of the Wilcox rule with respect to controlled
corporations may be expected to stimulate corporate formation of tax
protectorates.
HARRIS J. BELINKIE
Federal Income Taxation—Section 185( a ) —Losses: Corporate Loss
Deduction Denied on Sale of Realty Because Property Was Not Held
for Use in Trade or Business—International Trading Co. 1—Peti-
tioner, a brewery supply business2 , in Wisconsin, purchased thirteen
42 405 U.S. at 425 n.I4 (dissenting opinion).
48
 Id. If the subsidiary charges excessive premiums on the parent's life insurance
policies, the latter thereby obtains a greater "ordinary and necessary" business deduction
under § 162(a) and thus reduces its taxable income. The subsidiary then reports the
excessive premiums in its income for that year.
44 Act of March 13, 1956, Pub. L. No. 429, 70 Stat. 36, as amended by the Life
Insurance Company Tax Act of 1959, Act of June 25, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-69, 73 Stat.
112, as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1970).
48 405 U.S. at 425 (dissenting opinion).
48 See text at notes 19 and 39 supra.
1 57 T.C. 455 (1971).
2 In addition petitioners "held real estate and collected rents therefrom." Id. at 456.
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acres of land at Beaver Lake, Wisconsin, in 1944. For the next five
years petitioner expended more than four hundred thousand dollars
to construct and furnish a lavish residence and some small houses on
the lake property. From 1948 to 1950 petitionei received rental income
from certain individual stockholders and from four related companies
for use of the property. In 1950 petitioner attempted to sell the prop-
erty. It was eventually sold at public auction, in 1957, for $144,500.
As of the date of sale the adjusted basis of the asset was $447,167,
leaving an uncompensated loss after sale of $302,667. Petitioner
claimed an ordinary loss on the sale of the property in 1957, but it
was disallowed.' In 1959, during which year petitioner realized its
first capital gains, petitioner did not attempt to claim the loss as a
capital loss, even though corporate capital losses are allowable to the
extent of capital gains.' In 1960 and 1961, however, petitioner did
attempt to deduct a carryover loss,' claiming the loss from the sale
of the Beaver Lake property as a capital loss under section 165. ° The
Commissioner denied petitioner's deductions, asserting that petitioner
had not established that any capital loss from the sale should be avail-
able to petitioner for carryover to those years. As a result, the Com-
missioner determined that a tax deficiency existed for the fiscal year
1960.7 Moreover, as a result of petitioner's attempt to amend its
original claim and apply a portion of the loss to 1959, a tax deficiency
was issued for that year as well.' A majority of the tax court HELD:
Petitioner cannot take a loss deduction under section 165 and thus is
not entitled to a capital loss carryover for the fiscal years 1959 and
1960. The loss, the court ruled, was not allowable under section 165 (a)
because the property which was owned and subsequently sold by pe-
titioner was not held by it for use in its trade or business.
This note will attempt to show that the tax court erred in ruling
that the corporation must have used property in its trade or business
in order to deduct a loss on the sale of that property under section
165(a). It is submitted, rather, that section 165(a) does not require
3 Id. at 457.
4 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1211(a).
5 A capital loss carryover is permitted:
If for any taxable year a corporation has a net capital loss, the amount thereof
shall be a short-term capital loss—
(A) in each of the 5 succeeding taxable years . . . to the extent such amount
exceeds the total of any net capital gains (determined without regard to this
paragraph) of any taxable years intervening between the taxable year in which
the net capital loss arose and such succeeding taxable year.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1212(a)(1), as amended, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 512(a) (1969).
It should be noted that section 1212 does not allow a deduction for any Ices not otherwise
deductible under section 165 or some other deduction provision. Section 1212 merely
details how allowable capital losses may be deducted.
6 Although under the general rule of section 165(a) all capital losses are deductible,
section 165(f) specifically limits them to the extent allowed in sections 1211 and 1212.
7 Unexplainably the Commissioner did not issue a deficiency for 1961.
8 57 T.C. at 457. For the fiscal years 1959, 1960 and 1961, International claimed
capital loss carryovers of $118,583, $165,097 and $163,587 respectively.
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that losses, to be deductible, must arise out of a corporation's trade or
business.'
The tax court began its examination by determining whether or
not the Beaver Lake property was held by petitioner for use in its
trade or business. The Commissioner claimed that the property was
neither used in petitioner's trade or business nor held for the produc-
tion of income. In this connection, the court examined an earlier case
involving the same property, International Trading Co. v. Commis-
sioner (International I)." There the Seventh Circuit had determined
that the Beaver Lake property was held primarily for the benefit of
International's stockholders and that it had little or no business use.
At issue was the question of whether a portion of International's claimed
deductions for depreciation and maintenance expenses were allowable.
The Commissioner had disallowed a portion of the deduction for main-
tenance expenses and depreciation claimed by International under the
predecessors of section 162 (a) 1 ' and section 167(a) (1). 12 The Com-
missioner permitted only a deduction for expenses of an amount
equivalent to the gross rents received by International from its stock-
holders and included by International in its gross income." The re-
mainder was disallowed because the property was held "primarily for
the personal benefit of the stockholders and had little or no business
use." 14
 The circuit court held that the property was not used in Inter-
national's trade or business or held for the production of income."
In dealing with the instant International case, however, the tax
court could not designate the International I decision as controlling
or rely on it as sufficient grounds for disallowing deduction of the
claimed section 165 (a) loss. International I had disallowed the claimed
depreciation deduction because petitioner failed to meet the explicit
"trade or business" requirement of section 167. Section 165, however,
does not specifically require that the property meet a "trade or busi-
ness" test. It is primarily that difference which required the tax court
in the instant case to inquire into the meaning of section 165 and which
gives rise to the issues presented by this decision.
9 See text at notes 56-67 infra, where it is argued that in 1962 Congress adopted an
exception to the general rule of section 165(a), when it passed section 274 which disallows
corporate losses if the property involved was used as an entertainment, amusement or
recreational facility.
10 275 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1960).
11 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, 23(a)(1)(A). The provision allows as a deduction all
the ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in carrying on a trade or business.
12 Mt. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(1) (1)-(2). The provision allows as a depredation
deduction, the exhaustion of property used in the trade or business,
19 The Seventh Circuit indicated that the Commissioner's allowance of a setoff
of maintenance expenses and depreciation to the extent of income received from the
property had no reasonable basis and should therefore not have been made, 275 F.2d
at 587. The Commissioner's treatment of International appears similar to the treatment
afforded by section 183(b)(2) to individuals and to Subchapter S corporations whose
activities are not engaged in for profit,
14 17 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 521, 531 (1958), aff'd, 275 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1960).
19 275 F.2d at 588.
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The International court held, as had the Seventh Circuit in.Inter-
national I, that the Beaver Lake property was not used in petitioner's
trade or business or held for the production of income during the years
after 1950, when no rental income was received on the property. 16
With respect to the years 1948-1950, however, when certain amounts of
rents were received, the tax court noted that there might have been at
least some ground for finding a business use of the Beaver Lake prop-
erty had there been evidence sufficient to indicate whether or not
rental income exceeded expenses for those years.'' Such a demon-
stration, the court reasoned, "might mark the property as being held
for some business purpose at least in those early years." 18 The tax
court, then, apparently looked for the existence of some profit in order
to determine whether or not the property was held for a business pur-
pose. When it failed to find an actual profit, the court concluded, as had
the International I court before it, that the property was not held by
petitioner for use in its trade or business.
In reaching this conclusion the court did not appear to consider
the meaning of "trade or business" as established in other contexts by
case law. The case law interpreting the "trade or business" limitation
requires that "the activities must be entered into and carried on in
good faith for the purpose of making a profit."i° It can be concluded,
then, that the "trade or business" limitation requires neither the pro-
duction of an actual profit nor even a reasonable expectation of profit,
but rather "the existence of a substantial profit motive" It is sub-
mitted that the tax court misapplied the "trade or business" test by
requiring that petitioner produce an actual profit in order to be en-
titled to a loss deduction.
After determining the nonbusiness use of the Beaver Lake prop-
erty, the tax court narrowed its inquiry to the central issue: whether a
corporation could deduct a loss under section 165 (a) for property
which it owned but did not hold for use in its trade or business. Peti-
tioner contended that the explicit terms of section 165 (a) required the
allowance of the claimed loss deduction. This argument was based on
the fact that the corporate loss deduction granted by section 165(a) is
subject only to the two requirements that the loss be sustained in the
taxable year and that it not be compensated for by insurance or other-
wise: "There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss sustained during
18 57 T.C. at 459.
17 It is interesting to note that if the payors of the fair rental value had been
unrelated third parties rather than shareholders, depreciation, maintenance expenses and
a section 165(a) loss deduction would probably have been allowed.
18 57 T.C. at 459.
18 5 J. Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation	 28.31, at 131 (rev. ed. 1969)
(emphasis added). See Lamont v. Commissioner, 339 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1964); Hirsch
v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 731, 736 (9th Cir. 1963); Doggett v. Burnet, 65 F.2d 191, 194
(D.C. Cir. 1933).
28 5 J. Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation 28.31, at 131 (rev. ed. 1969).
See Hirsch v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 731, 736 (9th Cir. 1963); White v. Commissioner,
227 F.2d 779, 780 (6th Cir. 1955).
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the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance."" Tradition-
ally, then, if a loss existed and if the amount and the year of loss could
be determined, a corporation was accorded the benefit of the loss de-
duction without any questions relating to the employment of that prop-
erty in the corporate trade or business.' The Treasury regulations
develop the same requirements, stipulating that in order to be entitled
to a loss deduction, a corporation must show that the loss is (1) fixed
by a closed transaction, (2) identified by recognized events and (3)
sustained during the year claimed." If the corporation complies with
these requirements it is entitled to the deduction as a matter of right."
In marked contrast to the general terms of section 165(a), section
165(c) provides that deductible losses of an individual are restricted
to "(1) losses incurred in a trade or business; (2) losses incurred in
any transaction entered into for profit, though not connected with a
trade or business; and (3) losses of property not connected with a
trade or business, if such losses arise ... from . . . [a] casualty .. ."25
Both the title heading of section 165(c) and basic tax theory indicate
that these limitations are not applicable to corporations. The title
heading of section 165(c) explicitly limits applicability of that section
to individuals." Current tax theory finds the same limitation. As one
authority has stated: "The restrictions of § 165(c) are not appli-
cable to corporations, presumably on the theory that all corporate
transactions arise in trade or business.'
The petitioner in International argued that since 165 (a) lacked
the specific limitations set forth in 165(c), the former subsection must
be construed to allow the deduction of any loss sustained by a corpora-
tion: that is, a trade or business requirement should not be read into
section 165 (a). The tax court, however, rejected this literal approach
21 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 165(a) (emphasis added).
22 S. Surrey & W. Warren, Federal Income Taxation 338-39 (1960 ed. with 1961
Supp. integr.); 5 J. Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 28.05 (rev. ed. 1969).
See Richard R. Riss, Sr. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 388, rev'd, 57 T.C. 469 (1971). In the
earlier decision the court stated: "ruf our analysis of the 1954 statute is correct, it would
seem that, without regard to the use to which the items in question were put while held
by [taxpayer], the losses experienced by [taxpayer] as a result of their disposition were
clearly deductible under section 165 of the Code." 56 T.C. at 415.
28
 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(b) (1972). See Lee, Losses on Depreciable Property under
Section 165 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 10 How. L.J. 1, 2 (1964).
24 Id.
22 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 1 165(c). See Fleischer, The Tax Treatment of Expenses
Incurred in Investigation for a Business or Capital Investment, 14 Tax L. Rev. 567, 588
(1959).
20 The section is captioned "Limitation on Losses of Individuals." Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, § 165(c).
27 B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Share-
holders § 5.03, at 5-6 (3d ed. 1971). In the first Richard R. Riss, Sr. decision, the Tax
Court stated: "unlike the treatment accorded to individual taxpayers under section 165(c)
of the Code, wherein losses arc limited to three categories one of which is losses 'incurred
in a trade or business,' no equivalent section exists for losses , sought by corporations."
56 T.C. at 414.
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and chose instead to analyze the statutory history of section 165(a) to
determine whether or not petitioner's interpretation was valid. 28
The first appearance of the corporate loss deduction in federal tax
law was in the Act of 1894," which also imposed the first general
income tax. Section 32 of that Act provided:
that there shall be assessed, levied, and collected, .. . a tax
of two per centum annually on the net profits or income above
actual operating and business expenses, including expenses
for materials purchased for manufacture or bought for re-
sale, losses, and interest on bonded and other indebtedness
of all banks, . . . and all other corporations, companies, or
associations doing business for profit in the United States,
no matter how created and organized, but not including part-
nerships.80
After the 1894 income tax was declared unconstitutiona1, 81
 Congress
passed the Act of 1909, which imposed upon organizations incorporated
for profit an excise tax on the privilege of doing business measured by
the net income of the corporation." A corporate deduction for losses
was allowed to the extent that "all losses [were] actually sustained
within the year and not compensated by insurance or otherwise, in-
cluding a reasonable allowance for depreciation of property. . . ." 88
Then, in 1913, after ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, the excise
tax on the privilege of doing business was abandoned in favor of a tax
imposed directly on corporate net income." The 1913 provision for the
allowance of losses" was identical to that in the 1909 Act, and was
retained substantially unchanged in the Internal Revenue Code of
1939." Finally, when the Code was restructured in 1954, all of the
loss provisions of the 1939 Code were gathered into Section 165. 87 The
Senate Finance Committee explained that this change affected not the
substance but merely the structural arrangement of the loss provi-
sions."
28 See 57 T.C. at 459-61.
29 Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509.
80 Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509 (emphasis added).
si See Pollack v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
82
 Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11.
88 Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11.
34 Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.
88 Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II(G)(b), 38 Stat. 114.
89 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(f).
37 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 165.
38 S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4833
(1954). The Report stated:
Rules for the treatment of losses contained in various subsections of section 23
of the 1939 Code have been brought together in this section.
The general rule for losses of individuals (sec. 23(e)) and the rule for
corporations (sec. 23(f)) become subsections (a) and (c). The reference to the
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This review of the statutory history of section 165(a) led the
court to conclude that it was "simply assumed [by Congress] that
losses by corporations would arise out of its trade or business."" Only
because such an assumption could not be made with respect to indi-
viduals, the court concluded, were the explicit trade or business limita-
tions placed by Congress in section 165(c) and omitted from section
165(a). In short, an implied trade or business requirement must be
read into the latter section. It is submitted that although the court was
correct when it concluded that all corporate transactions were pre-
sumed by Congress to arise from a trade or business, it erred when it
went further and concluded that section 165(a) has an implied trade
or business requirement. If in fact Congress had intended that a "trade
or business" requirement be implied into section 165(a), then Congress
should have enacted a casualty loss provision to allow a corporation to
deduct losses of nonbusiness assets lost in a casualty. That is, if the
court's conclusions as to congressional intention were correct, then
casualty losses of corporate nonbusiness assets would not have been
deductible under 165 (a), and Congress would have had to provide
elsewhere for their deduction. The fact that Congress did not make
such a provision, while it made provision for individuals' deduction of
nonbusiness casualty losses," indicates that it did not intend that
the nonbusiness limitation placed on individuals be placed on corpora-
tions as well Moreover, it is highly unlikely that Congress would have
explicitly placed a nonbusiness limitation on individual losses while
intending but not placing the same limitation on corporate losses. In
fact, as will shortly be shown, when Congress did decide to enact such
a provision in 1962, it made the provision explicit'''. Hence it would
appear that Congress never intended that a nonbusiness limitation be
read into section 165(a).
To buttress its conclusion that Congress intended a trade or
business requirement in section 165(a), the court employed arguments
arising from three other code provisions. These arguments, discussed
in the remainder of this note, are principally based upon Section 167,
Section 172, and Section 274 of the Code.
basis for determining the amount of any loss (sec. 23(i)) is now subsection (b).
The treatment of wagering losses (sec. 23(h)) is contained in subsection (d).
The reference to capital losses (sec. 23(g)(1)) is now subsection (f). No
substantive change is made by this rearrangement.
Id.
89 57 T.C. at 461. In support of its conclusion, the court cited Surrey and Warren,
supra note 22, at 338, where the authors state that corporations are "presumed to be
carrying on a business for profit," and A. Parker, Deductions and Credits 76 (rev. ed.
1967), where it is stated that "[t]he requirement that the loss must arise from a trans-
action entered into for profit, or be incurred in a trade or business does not require
proof in the case of corporate taxpayers. It is presumed that any transaction entered
into by a corporation is either for profit or in connection with a trade or business."
40 hit. Rev. Code of 1954, § 165(c)(3)•
41 See text at 132-34 infra.
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Section 167 Argument
In order to implement effectively its section 167 argument, the
court applied the rule of "sensible construction."'" This rule states that
it will always be presumed that Congress intended exceptions to be
implied into the letter of a statute when necessary to avoid "injustice,
oppression, or an absurd consequence.' The tax court felt that this
"rule of sensible construction" should be applied here as it was by the
Supreme Court in Helvering v. Owens." In Owens the taxpayer had
sustained a casualty loss to his automobile. The issue presented to the
Court was whether the tax basis for determining the amount of a loss
sustained by injury to personal property, for which there is no annual
depreciation allowance, should be cost or cost less accumulated depre-
ciation—adjusted basis. The Court employed the adjusted basis to
determine the casualty loss even though a strict construction of the
casualty loss provision would seem to have required the use of a cost
basis." The Owens Court ruled that the casualty loss should be limited
"so that it [the loss deduction] may not exceed cost, and in the case
of depreciable non-business property may not exceed the amount of
the loss actually sustained in the taxable year, measured by the then
depreciated value of the property."
The tax court reasoned that application of the "rule of sensible
construction" as it was used in Owens would necessitate the disallow-
ance of the loss deduction upon sale of the Beaver Lake property. The
court believed that such disallowance was necessary to avoid what the
court considered to be an otherwise inevitable and undesirable conse-
quence—the frustration of the purposes of section 167, the deprecia-
tion deduction provision, which allows a deduction only for depre-
ciation of property used in the taxpayer's trade or business or held
for the production of income 9 7 That frustration, the court feared,
would result in a case where a depreciation deduction was denied to a
corporation because the property involved had failed to meet the
42 United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482 (1868).
43 Id. at 486. The Court noted:
The common sense of man approves the judgment mentioned by Puffendorf,
that the Balognian law which enacted, "that whoever drew blood in the streets
should be punished with the utmost severity," did not extend to the surgeon
who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street in a fit.
Id.
44 305 U.S. 468 (1939).
45 Since a loss deduction taken under the casualty loss provision is taken on non-
business property not subject to a depreciation deduction, the casualty loss provision
would seem to require application of the cost basis rather than the adjusted basis in
determining the amount of the loss.
40 305 U.S. at 471.
47 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(a). This section permits the deduction of:
a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable
allowance for obsolescence)—
(1) of property used in the trade or business, or
(2) of property held for the production of income.
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requirements of section 167. The corporation, after selling the same
property, would still be allowed a full loss deduction under section
165(a) if that provision imposed no trade or business test." The
International I court had denied a claimed depreciation deduction for
the structural improvements made to the Beaver Lake property." If
a full loss deduction were now allowed on the same property, that al-
lowance would give to petitioner benefits equal to, or more than, those
arising from a depreciation deduction. Such a result would frustrate
the purposes of section 167. Therefore, the court concluded, it must
deny the loss.
One dissenting member of the tax court, Judge Tannenwald, re-
jected this conclusion. He suggested that petitioners be granted a
partial loss deduction rather than a full loss deduction. Such a loss
would be limited to the "difference between the proceeds of sale and
the original cost less depreciation, albeit nondeductible depreciation!"ao
Imposing such a limit would avoid frustration of section 167 and at
the same time follow the rationale used by the Owens Court. There,
the Court actually granted a partial casualty loss deduction." It is sub-
mitted that the tax court failed to consider the possibility that a partial
loss deduction could be allowed without frustrating section 167. The
majority of the tax court had considered only the issue of whether a
full loss deduction would frustrate section 167."
Section 172 Argument
The tax court also feared that section 172 would be frustrated if
petitioner were allowed a full loss deduction." Section 172 permits a
deduction for net operating loss carryovers and carrybacks." A net
operating loss is defined in section 172(c) as "the excess of the deduc-
tions allowed by this chapter over the gross income."'" Thus, a cor-
45 57 T.C. at 462.
49 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 531-32.
50 57 T.C. at 468. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(1) (1972) which rules that
when dealing with the measurement of casualty losses
the amount of loss to be taken into account for the purposes of section 165(a)
shall be the lesser of either--
(I) The amount which is equal to the fair market value of the property
immediately before the casualty reduced by the fair market value of the
property immediately after the casualty; or
(U) The amount of the adjusted basis prescribed in § 1.1011-1 for determin-
ing the loss from the sale or other disposition of the property involved.
But see Nulex, Inc. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 769 (1958).
51 See text at note 46 supra.
52 In addition Judge Tannenwald suggested that the Owens rule could be applied
to limit the loss to the "difference between the proceeds of sale and the fair market value
of the property on the date of sale." 57 T.C. at 468. Since the fair market value on the
date of sale would be equal to the proceeds of sale, subtracting one from the other
would produce a zero loss. Id.
58 57 T.C. at 462.
54 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 172(b).
55 ht. Rev. Code of 1954, § 172(c).
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poration that wished to determine its net operating loss would include
among the "deductions allowed by this chapter" a depreciation deduc-
tion under section 167. Since the depreciation deduction had been dis-
allowed on the property involved in the instant case, petitioner would
not have been allowed to include an amount equal to this depreciation,
in its determination of a net operating loss. Now, the court argued,
if a full capital loss deduction were allowed upon sale of the same prop-
erty, which deduction would be includible in the determination of a
net operating loss, petitioners would in fact be given the benefit of the
disallowed depreciation deduction—thus frustrating section 172.
This reasoning, which led the tax court to conclude that section
172 would be frustrated should a loss deduction be allowed under
section 165(a), was parallel to the reasoning the court used in its sec-
tion 167 argument. It is submitted that the tax court was mistaken in
failing to consider the possibility that a partial loss deduction could be
allowed without frustrating section 172, just as it erred in failing to
follow Judge Tannenwald's suggestion that deduction of a partial loss
would not frustrate section 167. That is, the apparent inconsistency
between sections 172 and 165(a) could be resolved by applying Judge
Tannenwald's formula. Petitioner's loss would then be limited to the
difference between the property's sales price and its original cost, less
an amount equal to the depreciation that was not deductible under
section 167.
Section 274 Argument
Although section 274 56 is not applicable to the years for which the
Commissioner issued a deficiency statement," that provision was ex-
amined by the tax court to determine whether petitioner should be
granted the loss deduction it claimed under section 165(a). 59
 The court
concluded that subsection (g) of section 274, together with its legisla-
tive history, clearly required that losses on the sale of a nonbusiness
entertainment or recreational facility be disallowed under section
165(a). Subsection (g) provides:
(g) Treatment of Entertainment, Etc., Type Facility.—For
purposes of this chapter, if deductions are disallowed .. .
with respect to any portion of a facility, such portion shall be
treated as an asset which is used for personal, living, and
family purposes (and not as an asset used in the trade or busi-
ness).59
Congress gave a "technical explanation" of 274(g) which described
the results that that section was intended to achieve:
56
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 274.
57 The deficiency statements were issued for the years 1959 and 1960. 57 T.C. at
457. Section 274, however, did not become effective until Dec. 31, 1962. Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, 4 274.
38 57 T.C. at 462-63.
59 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, * 274(g).
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To the extent that expenses and other items with respect to
a facility are disallowed . .. that portion of the facility is to
be accorded the treatment provided under present law to an
asset used exclusively for personal, living, and family pur-
poses. Thus, the portion of a facility so treated will not be sub-
ject to depreciation, and losses incurred on the sale of such
portion will not be deductible."
The tax court argued that Congress, in promulgating section 274,
was not "altering the meaning of section 165 (a) ."°' That is, the addi-
tion of section 274 in 1962 did not mean that for the first time Con-
gress was refusing to permit a corporation to deduct losses arising
from the sale of property not used in its trade or business: section 274
was not to be interpreted as a refutation of the court's theory that
section 165 (a) had always imposed an implied requirement that the
property involved be used in the corporation's trade or business. To
support this argument the court pointed to the phrase "under present
law," used in the committee report, as proof that the law had not
changed from what it had been prior to 1962." Thus the court con-
cluded that Congress had always considered losses on the sale of cor-
porate entertainment or recreational facilities non-deductible under
section 165 (a) .°°
It is submitted, however, that the court's conclusion is erroneous.
As the court itself established, it had always been "assumed that losses
by corporations would arise out of its trade or business!'" In 1962,
however, Congress finally acknowledged explicitly that a corporation
could have assets not held for use in its trade or business. Thereafter,
under section 274, corporate entertainment and recreational facilities
were "to be accorded the [same] treatment provided under present
law to an asset used exclusively for personal, living and family pur-
poses."" It is submitted that the phrase "treatment provided under
present law" in the congressional committee report was not, as the
court believed, a reference to section 165 (a) as it then existed. Rather,
it should be interpreted as referring to that treatment provided for
assets used by an individual for his personal, living and family pur-
poses. Such assets are never subject to depreciation," and losses in-
curred on the sale of such assets are never deductible."
It is submitted, therefore, that 1962 did mark a dramatic change
on the part of Congress in its conception of corporate personality. Only
with the passage of section 274 was a corporation to be treated as
60 S. Rep. No. 1881, 1962-3 Cum. Bull. 881 (emphasis added).
el 57 T.C. at 463.
62 When the phrase under present law is used in the technical explanation of
section 274(g), it refers to the law as it existed prior to the enactment of section 274.
03 57 T.C. at 463.
04 Id. at 461.
00 S. Rep. No. 1881, 1962-3 Cum. Bull. 881.
60 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(a).
07 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 165(c).
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capable of having a personal nature. Thus, for the first time, a corpo-
rate loss deduction may be denied if it arises from a corporate activity
that does not meet congressional expectations.
This interpretation of the significance of the 1962 changes is sup-
ported by the treatment that Congress provided in section 274(f) for
corporate recreational facilities lost in a casualty. Realizing that a cor-
poration must be protected if a non-deductible recreational facility
were lost in a casualty, Congress allowed the corporation to deduct such
a loss "without regard to its connection with his [the taxpayer's]
trade or business." 66
 The language of the subsection adds that this
provision should be applied to a taxpayer which is not an individual, as
if it were an individual, 69
 a point underlined by the Treasury regula-
tions: "Thus, if a corporation sustains a casualty loss on an entertain•
ment facility used in its trade or business, it could deduct the loss even
though the facility was not used primarily in furtherance of the corpo-
ration's trade or business." 70 It is submitted that these statements
reveal congressional recognition that corporations bad never before
needed a casualty loss provision for non-trade or -business property.
This recognition in turn indicates that prior to 1962 section 165 (a)
permitted a deduction for all losses sustained on such property by a
corporation.
It would appear that all corporate losses, including those sustained
on property not used in the trade or business, were deductible before
the passage of section 274. Hence the tax court should have allowed
petitioner the benefit of the loss deduction which it claimed under
section 165(a). While it is admitted that after 1962, section 274 would
disallow losses from the sale of entertainment or recreational facilities,
petitioner should have been given the benefit of the law as it existed
prior to that time.
Conclusion
There appears to be no substantial ground for the tax court's
refusal to grant the loss deduction. The tax court's fear that both the
depreciation deduction and the capital loss carryover deduction pro-
visions would be frustrated, should petitioner be granted a loss deduc-
tion, were hollow fears. The tax court's conclusion that section 274
required the result that section 165 (a) contain a business requirement
appears unsupported by either fact or reason. This court decision
denies a loss deduction which should have been allowed and fails to
recognize that not until 1962 did Congress decide that a corporation
can have personal characteristics and so limit the hitherto expansive
application of section. 165(a).
ALLEN N. ELGART
68 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 274(f).
49 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 274(f).
70 Treas. Reg. f 1.274-6 (1963).
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